Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation: Should
the Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in
New Jersey-Or Revived Everywhere Else?
Bruce A. Green*

INTRODUCTION

Sixty-five years ago, an American Bar Association (ABA) committee interpreting the Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons)' concluded that it would be professionally improper for a part-time
prosecutor to agree to defend an individual in a civil action while simultaneously prosecuting him on felony charges.2 The committee
acknowledged that the representation of conflicting interests is ordinarily proper with the respective clients' consent. But it said that
client consent does not suffice in a case involving a public officer,
who has a duty "to be and remain above all suspicion, even at personal financial sacrifice."3 It concluded that such "[a]n attorney
should not only avoid all impropriety
but should likewise avoid the
4
appearance of impropriety."
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis
Stein Center for Law and Ethics. This Article is based on a report prepared by the
author and submitted to the NewJersey Supreme Court Professional Responsibility
Rules Committee.
I ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
2 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 77

(1932).
s Id.
4 Id. This approach was presaged by ABA Comm. on ProfessionalEthics and
Grieuances, Formal Op. 30 (1931) in which the Committee determined that a public prosecutor may not defend a person accused of a crime in another state. It reasoned:
It is a well-known fact that prosecutors are granted courtesies and assistance by the police departments, as well as the prosecuting authorities, of other cities and counties throughout the country. The practice
is of great benefit to the administration of criminal justice. If prosecutors indulged in the practice of defending criminals in states other
than their own, this helpful cooperation might easily and quickly be
withdrawn. Other evils, detrimental to the proper enforcement of
criminal laws, are not difficult to conceive, were prosecutors also acting as defenders of those accused of crime. Subjectively, the effect of
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The opinion was unremarkable but for the biblically resonant
exhortation to "avoid the appearance of impropriety."- The phrase,
capturing the principle that lawyers in public life, like judges,6
should err on the side of caution, was invoked by courts only rarely
over the next thirty-five years.7 Nonetheless, in 1969, when the ABA
replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code or Code)," the moral obligation to "avoid the appearance of impropriety" was incorporated in the title of a disciplinary rule whose provisions addressed the integrity of judicial and
public decision making;9 in a "canon" (an "axiomatic norm" from

such a practice upon the prosecutor himself must, in our opinion, be
harmful to the interest of the public, whose service is the prosecutor's
first and foremost duty.
Id.
Compare this with 1 Thessalonians5:22, exhorting to "abstain from all appearance of evil," as quoted in United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.

1964).
6

At that time, the ABA Canons of Judicial Conduct called for judges'
conduct

to "'be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.'" State ex reL.
Hannah v. Armijo, 28 P.2d 511, 512-13 (N.M. 1933) (quoting canons). See Peter W.
Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes,44 STAN. L.

REv. 593, 595-98 (1992) (discussing origination ofjudicial canon in 1919 Black Sox
affair). The injunction is preserved in the current ABA Model Code of Judicial

Conduct, Canon 2 (1990), which states: "AJudge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the

Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities." The accompanying
commentary explains: "The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry
outjudicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136, 145
(Neb. 1957); State v. Rosengard, 89 N.J. Super. 28, 33, 213 A.2d 262, 265 (Law Div.
1965); People v. Peck, 263 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 1965); N.J. Advisory Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 8 (1963).

a

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry

9 See MODEL

(1969).
DR 9-101 (1969), which pro-

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmIY

vided as follows:
Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
upon the merits of which he has acted in ajudicial capacity.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
Id. Under the Model Code, the Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character.
[They] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Preliminary Statement.
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which disciplinary rules were derived);1o and in several "ethical considerations" (aspirational principles)." Within a few years, every
state, with the exception of California,2 adopted a version of the
Model Code recognizing this obligation.
To the ABA drafters, the injunction to avoid the appearance of
impropriety was meant to serve as an aspirational principle to guide
lawyers in the exercise of their independent judgment, and perhaps
as a principle of interpretation, calling for restrictive readings of the
disciplinary rules in areas of uncertainty. It was not intended to serve
as a disciplinary standard or a disqualification rule." Courts, disciplinary bodies, and ethics committees soon discovered, however, that
the Code's disciplinary rules did not adequately address the full
spectrum of lawyers' questionable conduct. Some seized upon the
appearance of impropriety language as a catch-all to address the
Code's perceived shortcomings. As a result, these institutions soon
began to rely on the appearance of impropriety standard in evaluating the propriety of lawyers' conduct. 14 Further, they came to use it
not only in opinions addressing government lawyers' conflicts of interest, but also in addressing privately retained lawyers' conflicts of
interest. I!
In response, a number of courts and commentators, together
with the ABA's ethics committee, took the view that it was inappro10 See

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILnY Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should

Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety"). In the Model Code,
Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are
derived." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY Preliminary Statement.
1 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI"Y EC 9-3 ("After a lawyer leaves
judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept employment in
connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his
leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even
if none exists."); Id. at EC 9-6 ("Every lawyer owes a solemn duty.., to strive to
avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.").
In the Model Code, ethical considerations "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.
They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in
many specific situations." Id. at Preliminary Statement.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 56-57 (1983).

is

See AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-

sIBILny 398-99 (Maru ed., 1979).
14 See id. at 400-16.

is See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65, 571 (2d Cir.

1973); General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Estep v.Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (D. Conn. 1974).
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priate to employ so vague a standard" for anything other than lawyers' individual guidance." Their conviction that more precise and
objective measures were needed for disciplinary and disqualification
purposes carried the day in 1983 when the ABA, in replacing the
Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), 8 pointedly eliminated the appearance of impropriety standard.' 9 In the succeeding years, the overwhelming majority of states
adopted provisions based on the ABA Model Rules and all but one,
in doing so, followed the ABA's lead. 20
NewJersey, the maverick, went in the opposite direction when it
revised its ethical rules in 1984 in response to the new ABA model.
Contrary to recommendations of the committee it had appointed to
review the ABA's work product, the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted several provisions that specifically preserved the appearance2
of impropriety standard to address purported conflicts of interest. 1
The result was that, while concerns about appearances of impropri-

16 For an interesting discussion of the various levels
of generality and specificity
of ethical provisions, see Fred C. Zacharias, Specficity in Professional Responsiility
Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
223 (1993).
11 See, e.g., International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir.
1975) (observing that Canon 9 "should not be used promiscuously as a convenient
tool for disqualification when the facts simply do not fit within the rubric of other
specific ethical and disciplinary rules"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 n.17 (1975); infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
See generallyWOtRAm, supra note 12, at 322 & nn.46 & 47 (citing authority).
8 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1983).
19

See id. Rule 1.9 cmt.:

The other rubric formerly used for dealing with disqualification is the
appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a two fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any
new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel
anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former
client. Second, since "impropriety" is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved.., by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety.
Id.
0 See Carol M. Rice, The SuperiorDefense in Legal Ethics: Sending the Wrong Message
to Young Lawyers, 32 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 887, 938 (1997) (noting that "[a]s of the
fall of 1995, 38 states and the District of Columbia had adopted all, or significant
portions, of the Model Rules").
21 See infraPart I.C.
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ety diminished in importance elsewhere,' they remained central to
conflict-of-interest determinations in NewJersey."
Recently, both the ABA and the New Jersey Supreme Court began reexamining their respective ethical codes. The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a committee, chaired by retired Supreme
CourtJustice Robert L. Clifford, to reexamine its state's Rules of Professional Conduct. Several New Jersey law firms have prepared a
joint submission to the committee recommending that the appearance of impropriety rules be eliminated or substantially reduced in
24
scope. Meanwhile, the ABA appointed an "Ethics 2000" committee
to undertake a comprehensive review of the Model Rules. 2 At least
one member of this ABA committee is already on record as criticizing the existing conflict-of-interest provisions for not being sufficiently restrictive2--a problem that could conceivably be cured by
reintroducing the appearance of impropriety standard. Hence, the
question: Should the appearance of impropriety rule be eliminated
in NewJersey-or revived everywhere else?
See ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 152, 165-66, 181-83

(3d ed. 1996).
See infra Parts H.A & III.A.
24 See Stephen Gillers, Report to Clifford Committee on Rules of
Professional Conduct
14 (July 23, 1997) (concluding that the appearance of impropriety language "is unnecessary but ... creates the dangers of misuse and excessive self-restraint" and
should therefore be deleted); Bruce A. Green, Report to Clifford Committee on Rules of
Profesional Conduct 31-32 (Undated) (concluding that "the 'appearance of impropriety' test, if employed at all, should be reserved for cases especially implicating the
public interest"); Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., Report to Clifford Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct 1 (June 24, 1997) (opining that the rule "perpetuates an unnecessary
and mischievously ambiguous basis of disqualification and ought to be repealed"
and replaced by "additional specific rules" addressing "types of lawyer relationships
or conduct [that] are regarded as improper"); Raymond R. Trombadore, Report to
Clifford Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct 2 (July 7, 1997) (opining that the
appearance of impropriety rule should be repealed because "[w]e no longer need
the added comfort of a redundant rule which serves only to generate mischief").
25 See 13 ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 140 (May
28,
1997).
See Lawrence J. Fox, Letters--Seeking Clarity on Ethics, AM. LAw., Sept. 1997, at
33. Mr. Fox explained:
[T]he great downside of the switch from the Model Code to the
Model Rules has been the too-clever-by-half attempts by lawyers to
simply treat the conflict rules as impediments in the road, to be
avoided by simply fast maneuvering and adept steering. Lost in the
.gamesmanship" is the concept of loyalty that is the value-laden wellspring from which the rules are derived, a concept we [had] better recapture before we lose the edge our own ethics rules lend to us in
terms of being something more than crass businessmen-yes, of being
professionals.
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In reply, this Article demonstrates that both the meaning and
the utility of the appearance of impropriety rule depend on the context in which it is used. Focusing on how the rule has developed and
been applied in New Jersey, the Article identifies the virtues of the
rule in contexts involving alleged conflicts of interest on the part of
lawyers for public entities and in related contexts where the public as
a party has a direct stake. These are, not surprisingly, the contexts in
which the rule originated. In contrast, the Article argues that the
rule has nothing to commend it in contexts involving lawyers for private parties in which the public has no stake.
By way of background, Part I of this Article traces the development of New Jersey's appearance of impropriety rule. Part 11 discusses how the doctrine is presently applied in cases involving the
public interest and suggests that, in this realm, the rule performs a
useful function, albeit one that would be better served by more specific rules. Finally, using a recent NewJersey ethics opinion as an illustration, Part III identifies the deficiencies of the rule in cases involving exclusively private interests.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY RULE IN NEWJERSEY

Opinions Under the Canons of ProfessionalEthics

The NewJersey Supreme Court created the Advisory Committee
on Professional Ethics (Advisory Committee or Committee) in 1962
to furnish advisory opinions concerning lawyers' professional conduct under the then-applicable rules governing lawyers' practice, the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Since 1976, the Committee's opinions have been reviewable by the New Jersey Supreme Court.2 Together with the applicable rules themselves, the Advisory Committee's opinions are meant to provide guidance to NewJersey lawyers,
supplementing the comparatively few published opinions of the New
Jersey courts definitively interpreting the standards of professional
conduct.
From the start, a substantial portion of the Committee's work
responded to conflict-of-interest questions involving government
lawyers. Setting a pattern followed in its later decisions, the Committee's earliest opinion, Opinion 4,28 was published in June 1963 and
See Higgins v. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 73 NJ. 123, 127, 373 A.2d
372, 374 (1976).
28 NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 4 (1963).
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implicitly employed the appearance of impropriety standard in concluding that a lawyer representing a municipality may not represent
private clients before the municipality's board of adjustment. The
Committee reasoned:
In a broad sense an attorney representing a municipality or any
of its agencies has as his "client" the entire municipality, and he
should avoid any retainers from others which may place him in a
position where he appears to be either seeking relief or favor
from the municipality or its agencies for a private client or to oppose action by the municipality or its agencies on behalf of a private client. If he did so, it would be inevitable that, if he were
successful, the losing litigant, or the public in general, would be
troubled by suspicion that his success in the matter was attributable to improprieties and that his position or influence as a municinal attorney might have furthered the cause of the private client.
Further, the Committee concluded that, while an attorney representing private clients under similar circumstances may sometimes undertake the representation with the clients' consent, "consent is generally unavailable where the public interest is involved.""
Later that year, in Opinion 8,3' the Advisory Committee relied
explicitly on the appearance of impropriety standard to conclude
that a part-time municipal prosecutor may not appear against the
municipality in defense of a private client. Echoing the 1932 ABA
opinion, the Committee explained: "An attorney should not only
avoid all impropriety, but should likewise avoid the appearance of
impropriety. " "5

The appearance of impropriety standard had its genesis not
only in the early ABA opinion but also in New Jersey judicial decisions requiring public officials generally to refrain from conduct that
would call their integrity into question. For example, in 1961, a New
Jersey Superior Court condemned public officials for accepting a gift
from someone with whom they had official dealings, explaining:
Natural public suspicion of official wrongdoing, born of the
rightful publicity showered upon those who occasionally deviate
from their oath of office, demands that the legislator. and administrator, as the judge, take all essential steps not only to maintain

29

Id.

30

Id.

SN.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 8 (1963).
32
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his conduct free of impropriety, but also to avoid scrupulously
even the appearance of impropriety."
Thus, the Advisory Committee's recognition that municipal attorneys must refrain from engagements that would cause the public
to suspect them of improprieties was inextricably tied to the fact that
these attorneys were public officials. The propriety of the public lawyer's representation would be viewed from the public's perspective,
because the public is, in a sense, the ultimate client. Further, the
public lawyer must scrupulously avoid conflicting engagements in
order to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of government
decision making.
Contemporaneously, the New Jersey Supreme Court joined in
the view that municipal lawyers, as public officials, should hold
themselves to a more restrictive standard than lawyers in private
practice. In a Notice to the Bar in 1963,- the chief justice announced
that a lawyer could not represent a municipality or other public
agency and also represent private clients whose interests would come
before, or be affected by, the public agency." "Where the public interest is involved," the notice concluded, the lawyer may not represent the conflicting interests even with the respective clients' consent."6 Two years later, relying on this principle, the court held that a
municipal lawyer could not represent a developer operating in the
municipality.-7 A concurring opinion underscored that "[p]ublic officials are obligated to perform their duties not only with honesty,
faithfulness and ability but also with exclusive fidelity. By so doing,
an attorney not only will avoid all impropriety, but will avoid appearance of impropriety. "'
By November 1970, according to the Advisory Committee, fully
one-third of its opinions-66 out of almost 200-had "involved questions arising out of the relationship between lawyers and law firms
and governmental agencies in which the lawyer or a member of his
firm occupied an official position, either elective or appointive. "' 9
La Rue v. Township of East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super 435, 444-45, 172 A.2d
691, 696 (App. Div. 1961).
Joseph Weintraub, Notice to the Bar, 86 N.J.L.J. 713 (1963) (later quoted in
Matter of A. & B., 44 N.J. 331, 333-34, 209 A.2d 101, 102 (1965)).
3 See id.
3

Id.

See MatterofA. & B, 44 N.J. at 334, 209 A.2d at 103.
Id. at 337, 209 A.2d at 105 (Scettino, J., concurring); see also State v. Rosengard, 89 N.J. Super. 28, 33, 213 A.2d 262, 265 (Law Div. 1965) (citing N.J. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ops. 4 & 8).
9 N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 189 (1970).
37
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The Committee's touchstone was whether the representation would
give rise to an appearance of impropriety.
In contrast, only a handful of ethics opinions arising under the
Canons addressed conflicts of interest in contexts involving exclusively private interests. In these cases, the Advisory Committee sometimes adverted to the appearance of impropriety, but in a very different sense from how this consideration was employed in the cases
involving public officials. One of the Committee's earliest opinions,
Opinion 6,40 is illustrative of this point. The question presented in
that case was whether a lawyer who had previously represented the
purchaser of equipment could later represent the vendor in litigation against the purchaser for defaulting under the sales agreement.
The Committee concluded, not surprisingly, that the lawyer could
not properly switch sides in this manner. It reasoned that
[s]uch representation might well require the attorney to assert an
interpretation of, or a claim under the agreement which he approved for the purchaser. An attorney should not attempt to nullify his own work .... Even if the attorney were not required to
urge such a construction, he may not make such a change in allegiance. Such conduct would tend to impair the confidence which
a client has the right to repose in his attorney and would thus
tend to destroy one of the essentials of the professional relationship ....
Irrespective of any actual detriment the purchaser
might suffer, he might naturally feel that he had in some way
been wronged when confronted by an action against him by the
same attorney whom he had employed to advise him concerning
the same agreement. To maintain public confidence in the bar,
it is necessary not only to avoid actual wrongdoing, but even the
appearance of wrongdoing.'
In contexts involving exclusively private interests, the appearance of impropriety standard was not meant to preserve public confidence in public lawyers and the operation of public agencies.
Rather, the standard primarily preserved the private client's confidence in his lawyer and in the bar generally. At the same time, the
phrase evoked the concept that so-called potential, as well as actual,
conflicts were proscribed. In certain situations involving conflicts of
interest, the representation is forbidden even if there would be no
actual wrongdoing-that is, even if the lawyer would not violate confidences, serve incompetently or disloyally, or otherwise act to harm
the client or former client. The lawyer must avoid the possibility (or,
40
41

N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 6 (1963).
Id. (citations omitted).
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from the private client's perspective, the perception) that the lawyer
will, or did, act wrongfully.
Adoption and Application of the New Jersey Code of Professional

B.

Responsibility
In 1971, the NewJersey Supreme Court adopted the NewJersey
Code of Professional Responsibility (NewJersey Code), based on the
Model Code, in place of the Canons of Professional Ethics. None of
the disciplinary rules expressly incorporated the appearance of impropriety standard to determine whether a particular representation
would be permissible.
Disciplinary Rules (DRs) 5-101 through 5-107 addressed conflicts of interest. The most generally applicable conflict-of-interest
provision, DR 5-101 (A), provided:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. 42
With respect to the representation of multiple clients, DR 5-105
required a lawyer to decline or withdraw from the representation "if
the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance
of the proffered employment," unless the lawyer "believes that he
can adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents
to the representation after full disclosure ... ."4" This rule further
provided that if the lawyer was required to decline or to withdraw
from employment to avoid a conflict of interest, other members of
the lawyer's firm were required to do so as well."4
These provisions also specifically addressed, among other
things, the problem that arises when a lawyer
S 45 might be both an advocate and a witness in the same proceeding, lawyers' business relations with their clients,4 and the influence of third parties who compensate the lawyer to provide services for the client. 4 Of these rules,
only DR 5-107(A) explicitly took account of the public interest. This
provision allowed a lawyer to accept compensation from someone
NJ. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILnY DR 5-101 (A) (1971)
43 Id. atDR5-105.
42

44

45
46

47

See id.

See id. at DR 5-101 (B), 5-102.
See id. at DR 5-104.
See id. atDR 5-107(A).
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other than his client "with the consent of his client and provided the
public interest is not adversely affected.""
Another relevant provision, DR 9-101, was titled, "Avoiding Even
the Appearance of Impropriety."" It restricted a lawyer from accepting private employment that would involve a matter he had overseen
as a judge or for which he had been responsible as a public employee. It also prohibited a lawyer from stating or implying that he
could improperly influence a court, legislative body, or public official. Notwithstanding the rule's title, the provisions of DR 9-101
made no reference to appearances of impropriety. Rather, the rule
announced the applicable standard of professional conduct in more
objective and precise terms.
Although the New Jersey Code contained no disciplinary provision that assessed the propriety of a lawyer's conduct based on
whether or not it engendered an "appearance of impropriety," both
Advisory Committee opinions and judicial decisions, over the course
of the twelve years following adoption of the code, employed this
standard. In this regard, NewJersey was not alone. 5° As discussed below, the overwhelming majority of New Jersey opinions employing
this standard concerned lawyers in public employ, and of those involving the interests of private clients, the majority invoked the standard to compensate for the absence of a directly applicable provision
of the code.
1. Cases Involving the Public Interest
For the most part, the Advisory Committee used the appearance
of impropriety standard (very often tacitly) to resolve the kinds of
problems for which this standard had originally been developed:
problems involving lawyers who were presently or formerly in public

48 Id. (emphasis added).

'9 The rule provided as follows:
Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
upon the merits of which he has acted in ajudicial capacity.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had a substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence
improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative
body, or public official.
N.J. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILiY DR 9-101 (A) (1971).
so See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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employ. For example, in Opinion 467,' the Committee considered
whether a member of the Attorney General's staff could accept a position in the Department of Public Advocate, which was a party, possible party, or amicus curiae in three matters in which the lawyer had
participated while in the Attorney General's office. Although DR 9101(B) addressed a lawyer's movement from public to private employment, it did not address movement from one public office to
another. The Committee therefore addressed the question under
the appearance of impropriety standard. It explained:
DR 9-101 is derived from Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even
the Appearance of Impropriety." This precept is the policy consideration behind that rule. It is raised when it appears that an
attorney is "switching sides" for personal benefit. We invoke it
where there is an adequate basis for a belief by members of the
public reasonably familiar with governmental affairs that these relationships create a high risk of impropriety.52
The Committee concluded that, as long as the lawyer was screened
from the litigations in which he had previously participated, "there is
no risk that the public may view the employment change as creating
a high risk of impropriety.""3
By May 1983, the Advisory Committee had published more than
300 additional opinions, of which a high percentage continued to
deal with "relationships between lawyers and governmental agencies
in which a lawyer or his office associates occupied positions. "" By
way of example, during the two-month period from November 16,
1978, toJanuary 11, 1979, the Committee published seven opinions,
numbered 409 through 415, all of which addressed conflicts of interest concerning a present or former lawyer for a public or quasi55
public entity.
5

N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 467 (1981).

52

Id.

5I Id.
N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 516 (1983).
56 See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 409 (1978) (finding conflict in developer's hiring of former assistant township attorney); NJ. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 410 (1978) (conflict created by municipal
prosecutor prosecuting police officer); NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 411 (1978) (finding that defense of cases by the attorney for the Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association in which policemen were plaintiffs may raise the appearance of impropriety); N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 412 (1978)
(finding no conflict where municipal attorney would defend suit brought by a former mayor); N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 413 (1978) (finding
that attorney whose partners represented landlords should disqualify himself from
drafting rent control ordinances); N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
414 (1979) (concerning whether a municipal attorney had to comply with disclo-
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In Higgins v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics," the New
Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the Advisory Committee's continued
reliance on the appearance of impropriety standard to deal with lawyers in government service. Further, in Higgins and other opinions,
the court itself employed this standard to deal with lawyers' professional conduct that implicated the public interest. These included
not only cases involving government lawyers but also criminal cases,
in which the appearance of impropriety test promoted "[p]ublic
confidence in the integrity of our criminal justice process." 7 The
appearance of impropriety test was used in any of at least four ways
in the supreme court's decisions.
First, the appearance of impropriety test was used to address
concerns that were not adequately addressed by the conflict-ofinterest rules. For example, in Higgins, the court concluded that a
lawyer may not represent a criminal defendant in the same county in
which the lawyer serves as freeholder. It rejected the argument that
the appearance of impropriety standard "is vague, subjective and
demeaning to the bar,", but at the same time stressed that there must
be a "reasonable basis," which, in the context of the opinion, meant
a genuine harm threatened by the representation.-" Because of the
freeholder's influence over financial expenditures by the prosecutor's office, the court found, there was a "potential for undue influence" when the lawyer-freeholder "negotiates with the prosecutor's
office with regard to downgrading a criminal charge, plea or sentence. " 59 Further, even if the lawyer did not in fact attempt to obtain
"more favorable consideration for the client because of the attorney's official position," there would be an appearance that he had
sought and/or obtained such favorable treatment.'
Second, in some opinions, the appearance of impropriety test
was used not as an independent basis of assessing the representation,
but rather as ajustification for a highly restrictive interpretation of a
specific disciplinary rule that addressed the conduct in question. For
sure requirements that would require naming previous clients); N.J. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 415 (1979) (finding that a partnership or
shared office arrangement between a municipal attorney and an attorney for the
county in which that municipality is located is improper).
73 N.J. 123, 128-29, 373 A.2d 372, 374-75 (1977).
V State v. Rizzo, 69 NJ. 28, 29, 350 A.2d 225, 225-26
(1975) (determining that
lawyers could not represent criminal defendants after having served as county
prosecutors during the investigation that led to the indictment).
Higgins,73 NJ. at 128-129, 373 A.2d at 375.
59 Id. at 128, 130, 373 A.2d at 374, 376.
W Id. at 129-30, 373 A.2d
at 375-76.
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example, in In re Advisory Opinion on ProfessionalEthics No. 361,1 the
court invoked this concern tojustify a restrictive interpretation of DR
9-101(B), which barred a lawyer from "accept[ing] private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he
was a public employee." 62 The court read "substantial responsibility"
to mean virtually any responsibility for or knowledge of the matter.
The court made the point that even if the lawyer would not misuse
information acquired in his official capacity-misconduct against
which the disciplinary rule was meant to protect-the lawyer was
obliged to "avoid even the appearance of impropriety.., for the
sake of public confidence
in the probity of the administration of
6
[criminal] justice." '
Third, the identification of an appearance of impropriety was
sometimes used as an alternative reason to condemn conduct that
was, in any event, improper under a straightforward interpretation of
specifically applicable rules. An example is In re Garber," where a
lawyer was disciplined for representing both a long-time social and
business acquaintance who was accused of a "gangland style" murder
and, at the same time, the eyewitness to the murder. The court
found that the simultaneous representation violated both DR 5105(A) and 5-101(A), and that under those rules, the representation
could not have been undertaken even with the informed consent of
both clients (which was lacking) because a lawyer could not reasonably believe that he could represent both clients adequately. 65 Nevertheless, the court went on to address the conduct under an appearance of impropriety standard, concluding that "in addition to clear
violations of DR 5-105(A) and DR 5-101(A), predicated upon an actual conflict of interest, respondent also fostered the appearance of
such a conflict."'
Finally, and most problematically, the court sometimes employed the appearance of impropriety standard to substitute for specific conflict-of-interest rules that addressed both the conduct in
question and the potential harms to which that conduct might give
rise. An example is In re Opinion No. 415,67 which concluded that lawyers in a partnership or association may not represent both a county
61
62
63

65

67

77 NJ. 199, 390A.2d 118 (1978).
Id. at 202, 390 A.2d at 119.
Id. at 206, 390 A.2d at 121.
95 N.J. 597, 472 A.2d 566 (1984).
See id. at 609, 472 A.2d at 573.
Id. at 609-11, 472 A.2d at 573-74.
81 N.J. 318, 407 A.2d 1197 (1979).
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and a municipality within the county. The problem posed in this
case was the joint representation of two clients with possibly conflicting interests. But neither the court's opinion nor the Advisory
Committee opinion cited DR 5-105, a rule specifically addressing
joint representation and dealing with the precise harm with which
both the court and the Committee were concerned. In part, this
might have been explained by the court's observation that "[w]hen
representation of public bodies is involved, the appearance of impropriety assumes an added dimension. Positions of public trust call
for even more circumspect conduct.""8 The implication was that, in
cases involving government lawyers, a more restrictive standard applied. Thus, the appearance of impropriety standard superseded DR
5-105, which would presumably be reserved for lawyers representing
private clients.
2.

Cases Involving Exclusively Private Interests

The appearance of impropriety standard was also employed,
however, in non-criminal cases involving lawyers for private parties.
One use was to address perceived errors and omissions in the New
Jersey Code provisions that dealt specifically with conflicts of interest.
For example, the New Jersey Code lacked a provision addressing a
lawyer's representation adverse to a former client. Therefore, as it
had in the earlier Opinion 6,69 the Advisory Committee continued to
rely on the concern for avoiding appearances of impropriety to justify restricting this practice.0 The NewJersey Supreme Court did so
as well.7'
Similarly, DR 5-101 (A), unlike DR 5-105, failed to take account
of cases where a conflict of interest was so likely to undermine the
representation that a lawyer should not undertake the representation even with the client's consent. The Advisory Committee dealt
with this apparent oversight by adverting to the concern for appearances of impropriety. In Opinion 495,72 the Committee concluded
that a lawyer is categorically forbidden from representing the purId. at 324, 407 A.2d at 1200.
69
70

See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of this opinion.
See, e.g., NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 507 (1982); cf. N.J.

Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 356 (1976) (citing NJ.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIlY

CODE OF

DR 4-101(B) (3), 5-105(A), (D) (1971) and finding

that law firm may not represent husband on appeal in matrimonial action where
wife previously had conferred with a member of the firm).
71 See, e.g., Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 NJ. 460, 416 A.2d 852
(1980); In re
Cipriano, 68 NJ. 398, 346 A.2d 393 (1975).
72 NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 495 (1982).
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chaser of real estate and, at the same time, representing the mortgagee-lender. It reasoned: "The situation is... inherently creative of
an appearance of impropriety such that it cannot be permitted even
if disclosure is made to all parties.""
In ordinary cases, however, the conflict-of-interest rules might
have seemed adequate to resolve questions concerning the multiple
representation of private clients and other questions involving conflicts of interest. These rules were drafted with consideration for the
public perception of lawyers' conduct and drew lines based, in part,
on that consideration. Use of an appearance of impropriety standard in such situations would have the effect of supplanting rules
that provided a familiar analytic framework with a vague standard
that was not even contained in a disciplinary rule. At times, the Advisory Committee, accordingly, relied exclusively on the specific
rules.74
The supreme court had not made explicit, however, that the
appearance of impropriety standard was inapplicable in the gardenvariety case and was to be reserved for either cases involving the public interest or other cases that were inadequately addressed by the
conflict-of-interest rules. Further, broad pronouncements in some
of the court's decisions implied that the test was universally applicable, because an underlying concern-present in every representation-was the public's (as distinguished from the client's) confi7
Id.; cf. NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 513 (1983)
(concluding that with client consent, a lawyer may obtain title insurance for a client
from a local title abstract company in which the lawyer owns a minority interest because it is "unlikely that a perception of impropriety will be generated"). In contrast, this omission was addressed by the New York State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics by reading into DR 5-101 the same limitation contained explicitly in
DR 5-105. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 635 (1992)
(citing prior opinions).
7
See, e.g., NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 502 (1982) (stating
that joint representation of insured plaintiff and insurance carrier may not be undertaken under DR 5-105 (C) where a question of coverage is in issue); NJ. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 486 (1981) (holding that lawyer may not jointly
represent mother and minor as defendants in automobile negligence action because "possibilities of conflict may arise" and the minor cannot consent under DR 5105(C)); NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 421 (1979) (finding that
DR 5-102(A) does not invariably require the lawyer immediately to withdraw from
representation before trial when he expects to be called as a witness); NJ. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 419 (1979) (stating that under DR 5-101(B), law
firm B may represent decedent in workmen's compensation action against law firm
A, notwithstanding that lawyer in firm B was formerly employed by firm A); NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 357 (1976) (finding that lawyer may generally represent insured plaintiff and plaintiffs insurance carrier with informed
consent under DR 5-105(C)).
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dence in the legal profession. For example, the court declared that
"[w]e must view the conduct as an informed and concerned private
citizen and judge whether the reputation of the Bar would be lowered if the conduct were permitted," 7' and, to like effect, that "[t]o
maintain public confidence in the bar it is necessary that the appearance of, as well as actual, wrongdoing be avoided."76 Even more significant was a 1975 opinion dealing with another situation inadequately addressed by the NewJersey Code: a lawyer's involvement in
a real estate transaction in which he took unfair advantage of individuals who had placed their trust in him (albeit, not in the context
of a lawyer-client relationship). 7 The court found that the lawyer's
exploitative conduct "ran afoul of DR 9-101 entitled 'Avoiding Even
the Appearance of Impropriety.'"78 Rejecting the suggestion that a
lawyer could be sanctioned only on the basis of the specific disciplinary provisions of DR 9-101, the court endorsed the view that the
appearance of impropriety standard is "all-inclusive."79
Consistent with the NewJersey courts' broad pronouncements,
in a number of non-criminal cases involving the representation of
private clients-including non-litigation contexts-the Advisory
Committee invoked an appearance of impropriety as a consideration, rather than relying solely on the conflict-of-interest rules that
were clearly designed to address the situation. For example, in Opinion 495,7 the Committee concluded that a lawyer may not represent
both the purchaser of real estate and the purchaser's mortgage
lender. The opinion acknowledged DRs 5-101, 5-105, and 5107(A) (2), which might have justified this result. But the Committee, adverting to an opinion that pre-dated the New Jersey Code,
characterized the question as whether there was a "real or potential"
conflict of interest and whether an appearance of impropriety existed."' The Committee concluded that "[t]he situation presented is
basically contrary to the professional standards required and inherently creative of an appearance of impropriety such that it cannot be
permitted even if disclosure is made to all parties."8

In re Opinion No. 415,81 N.J. 318, 325, 407 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1979).
In re Cipriano, 68 NJ. at 403, 346 A.2d at 395.
77 See In re Hurd, 69 NJ. 316, 354 A.2d
78 (1975).
78 Id. at 330, 354 A.2d
at 85.
'1 See id. (quoting In re Lanza, 65 NJ. 347, 354, 322 A.2d 445, 449 (1974)
(Pashman,J., dissenting)).
so NJ.Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 495 (1982).
See id.(citing In reKamp, 40 NJ.588, 194 A.2d 236 (1963)).
Id.
75
76
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C. Adoption of the New Jersey Rules of ProfessionalConduct
1. The ABA Model Rules
In 1977, the ABA appointed the Kutak Commission to study the
Model Code. The commission was formed in response to severe
criticisms of the Code, one being that some jurisdictions had invoked Canon 9, dealing with the "appearance of impropriety," as a
disciplinary standard. In part, jurisdictions (including New Jersey)
had done so in reaction to omissions in the Code. For example, a
number of jurisdictions (New Jersey among them) had invoked this
standard to address the matter of representation adverse to a former
client.8" However, jurisdictions had also invoked the appearance of
impropriety standard to supersede specific conflict-of-interest provisions such as DR 5-105, with the result that representation permitted
under the specific rule might be forbidden as creating an appearance of impropriety.8
By the time of the Kutak Commission's work, commentary on
the subject was predominantly critical of the appearance of improOne criticism was that use of the phrase
priety standard.
"appearance of impropriety" obscures the process by which lawyers
and authorities ought to determine whether there is an impermissible conflict of interest." Another was that it leads to results that are
inconsistent with the specific conflict-of-interest provisions, thereby
"present[ing] lawyers with very strongly conflicting inclinations. " 8 In
either case, it was suggested, erroneous decisions resulted. 8'
83

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, in 36 THE

NEwYoRK 77, 89-90 (1981).
407-09.
85
See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
342, at n.17 (1975) ("had [the appearance of impropriety test] been included as an
element in the disciplinary rule [Rule 9-101 (B) I it is likely that the determination
of whether particular conduct violated the rule would have degenerated from a determination of the fact issues specified by the rule into a determination on an instinctive, ad hoc or even ad hominem basis").
"6 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and ProfessionalAspirations, 30
CLV. ST. L. R.v. 571, 574 (1982).
See, e.g., Victor H. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety under Canon 9: A Study
of the FederalJudicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243, 264 (1981)
("Canon 9 of the ABA Code has developed into a source of unpredictable, post hoc
rule making regarding the standards of professional conduct."); Neil D. O'Toole,
Canon 9 and the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62
MARQ. L. Rv. 313, 344 (1979) ("Canon 9 has generated more problems for the adjudicative process than it has solved"). For more recent criticisms, see Morgan, supra note 6, at 615-21; Beth Nolan, PublicInterest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control
Limits on the OutsideIncome of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 57, 77-78 (1992)
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
84 See AmEPCAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra
note 18, at
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The work of the Kutak Commission led to the ABA's adoption
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in 1983.
The general framework for addressing possible conflicts of interest is
set forth in Rule 1.7(b). The lawyer must begin by determining
whether "the representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests. " " If so, the lawyer must refrain from
the representation unless "the lawyer reasonably believes that representation will not be adversely affected," in which event the lawyer
may undertake the representation only if "the client consents after
consultation." " The Model Rules also included provisions dealing
with specific concerns.
Further, with respect to conflicts of interest, the Model Rules
addressed perceived omissions in the Code. For example, Rule 1.9
specifically addressed the matter of representation adverse to a former client. In accordance with the "substantial relationship" rule
developed in disqualification decisions over the course of the prior
quarter-century, it provided:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
consents after consultation."°
Model Rule 1.7(b), the general rule governing conflicts of interest, provided that in all cases, not only those involving joint representation, client consent would not cure the problem unless "the
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected."9'
At the same time, the Model Rules eliminated any reference to
"appearances of impropriety" as a possible standard by which to
judge whether a lawyer may represent a particular client.9 This reflected a plain intention "to abandon it as an independently operating standard."3

(appearance standard should not be used to judge or sanction individual conduct
but "has continued vitality in constructing categorical rules to promote public confidence in government.").
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
8

Id.
90 MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr

Rule 1.9 (1983).
91 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b).
92 See supranote 19.
3

WoLFRAM, supra note

12, at 322.
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Report of the Debevoise Committee

In July 1982, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a committee on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (known as the
"Debevoise Committee" after its chairman, now-United States District
Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise) for the purpose of reviewing the
ABA's proposed Model Rules. The committee was comprised of
judges, academics, prominent members of the New Jersey bar, and
two prominent non-lawyer members." Its report, dated June 24,
1983, endorsed the general substance and format of the ABA Model
Rules and recommended that they be adopted with suggested modi9
fications. "
The first and most extensive section of the report addressed
conflicts of interest.96 Its principal recommendation was that "New
Jersey's 'appearance of impropriety' standard should be abandoned." 9 The report focused on the use of this test to justify restrictions on government lawyers and former government lawyers. One
concern was that the test failed to provide fair notice. Another was
that it had been used to justify undue restrictions out of line with
those identified in otherjurisdictions. The report explained:
New Jersey nonetheless has continued after the adoption of the
DR's to construe the rules as prohibiting any representation that
the public might perceive as inappropriate because it somehow
could create the appearance of something unseemly. In that
construction New Jersey has stood almost alone. The Code of
Professional Responsibility was drafted for the avowed purpose of

expressing in black letter rules precisely what conduct or what
omission would subject a lawyer to discipline, much as criminal
statutes are intended to give fair warning in advance as to what

specific conduct may result in penal sanctions.
...
The present NewJersey approach unduly limits lawyers'
representation of clients where no actual conflict exists and it
unduly limits clients' selection of lawyers where no actual conflict
exists. It imposes upon attorneys a disciplinary rule that is vague
and undefined. The rule's contours are defined in retrospect on
a case-by-case method, which is not a satisfactory procedure when

See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 92 &
n.40 (1994).
95 See NEw JFRsEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, REPORT
96 See id.
97 Id.

(1983).

1997]

CONFLICTS OFINTEREST

335

dealing with rules of conduct. The proposed Model Rules carefully define the situations in which representation is proper and
provide safeguards to ensure against improper representation.
The waiver provisions of Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 and Rules 1.11
and 1.12 provide a framework for responsible decisions. 98

3.

Adoption of Rule 1.7(c)(2)

In adopting the NewJersey Rules of Professional Conduct (New
Jersey Rules) in 1984,"g the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
Debevoise Committee's recommendation that it eliminate the appearance of impropriety rule. Instead, the court included, as Rule
1.7(c) (2), a provision explicitly preserving the effect of case law and
ethics opinions applying this test."° Additionally, Rule 1.9 incorpo98

Id.

New Jersey was the first state to adopt the Model Rules. See GEoFREY
C.
HODEs, THE LAW OF IAWYERING app. 4 (2d ed. Supp. 1994)
(observing that, as ofJanuary 1, 1994, 37 states had adopted a version of the Model
Rules).
100Rule 1.7 of the NewJersey Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
RPC 1.7 Conflict of Interest General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the client, except that a public
entity cannot consent to any such representation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the client, except that a public
entity cannot consent to any such representation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken,
the consultation shall include explanation of the implications
of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
(c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to
the effect that:
(1) in certain cases or categories of cases involving conflicts or
apparent conflicts, consent to continued representation is immaterial; and
(2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an
ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would
HAzARD,JR. & W. Wuimt
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rated 1.7(c) by reference,'0 ' and Rule 1.11 specifically preserved the
appearance of impropriety standard. 0 2 The preservation of the appearance of impropriety test was one of a number of respects in
which the NewJersey Rules departed from the ABA model. 10
II. THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD IN CONTEXTS
INVOLVING THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"
A.

The Virtues of the Standard

Since the New Jersey Rules were adopted, the appearance of
impropriety test under Rule 1.7(c) (2) has been employed predominantly in the context in which the test was originally developed: in
situations "pos[ing] substantial risk of disservice to... the public interest."' °4 The most common cases of this type continue to be those
involving government lawyers or former government lawyers. This is
in accord with one of the most often stated purposes ascribed to the
rule: "[T]o maintain public confidence.., in our system of government."0 5 The test has also been used in criminal cases, in which

"conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk
of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one
of the clients.
N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995).
101 See NJ. RuLFs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 1.9(b) (1995),
dealing with
representation adverse to a former client, which provides as follows: "The provisions of RPC 1.7(c) are applicable as well to situations covered by this rule." Id.
102 See N.J. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(b) (1995), dealing with
successive government and private employment, which provides as follows:
An appearance of impropriety may arise from a lawyer representing a
private client in connection with a matter that relates to the lawyer's
former employment as a public officer or employee even if the lawyer
did not personally and substantially participate in it, have actual
knowledge of it, or substantial responsibility for it. In such an event,
the lawyer may not represent a private client, but a firm with which
that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation if:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom, and (2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
Id.
See Michael P. Ambrosio, The "New" New Jersey Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Reordered Prioritiesfor Public Accountability, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 121 (1987); Levin,
supra note 94, at 94-95 (observing that New Jersey adopted the most far-reaching
disclosure obligation of any state).
,' NJ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c) (2).
o5 InreProf'l Ethics Op. 452, 87 NJ. 45, 50, 432 A.2d 829, 832 (1981).
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the public is, in a sense, a party and in which the strong public interest in the proper administration of criminal justice is at stake.'06
On its face, the appearance of impropriety test would seem to
provide little meaningful guidance in resolving possible conflicts of
interest in such cases. Lifting a phrase from Rule 1.7(c) (2), the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated: "The critical guideline is whether an
appearance of impropriety would arise in the mind of an 'ordinary
knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts.'"'0 7 This guideline
would seem to invite-indeed, require--disciplinary bodies, the Advisory Committee, and the courts to make impressionistic, ad hoc
decisions, drawing on empirically unfounded, highly personal judgments about how the hypothetical "ordinary knowledgeable citizen"
would perceive particular scenarios involving lawyers. In the traditional context involving public lawyers, however-and only in this
context-the test has several possible redeeming qualities.
1. Close Scrutiny

The appearance of impropriety test calls for scrutinizing representation by government lawyers especially closely and under a more
restrictive standard than the standard applied to lawyers representing private clients. The result is that representation sometimes may
not be undertaken by the government lawyer, even though it might
permissibly be undertaken by a lawyer for a private client in an
analogous situation.'08
106 See, e.g., In reMilita, 99 N.J. 336, 342, 492 A.2d 380,
383-84 (1985) ("We have
always emphasized that not only impropriety but 'even the appearance of impropriety' that casts doubt upon the integrity of the criminal process must be avoided.");
In re Garber, 95 NJ. 597, 614, 472 A.2d 566, 575 (1983). The Garber court observed:
In the context of the criminal proceedings in this case..., the interests that are implicated transcend those of the immediate parties or
their attorneys. The public itself has the greatest stake in the propriety of the legal relationships that are created to properly administer
criminal justice.... Clearly, the public interest in the administration
of criminal justice in the circumstances of this case compelled the unbiased and unstinted representation of [the eyewitness].
Id.
107 In re Tenure Hearing of Onoverole, 103 N.J. 548, 562,
511 A.2d 1171, 1178
(1986).
0 See, e.g., In re Opinion No. 653, 132 N.J. 124, 130, 623 A.2d 241, 244 (1993)
("'Positions of public trust call for even more circumspect conduct'") (quoting In re
Opinion 415, 81 N.J. 318, 407 A.2d 1197 (1979)); In re Inquiry to the Advisory
Comm., No. 58-91(B), 130 N.J. 431, 435, 616 A.2d 1290, 1291-92 (1992) ("The appearance of impropriety has special relevance for attorneys invested with the public
trust, such as a government attorney or, as here, an attorney who is a full-time police
officer."); In re Petition for Review of Opinion No. 569, 103 NJ. 325, 330, 511 A.2d
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The court's decision in Ross v. Canino,' although decided
shortly before the Rules of Professional Conduct took effect, is nevertheless illustrative. The question was whether the law firm of a
former Attorney General (AG) could represent plaintiffs in a civil
suit involving matters that had been investigated by divisions of the
Department of Law and Public Safety during the former AG's term.
While holding that the law firm could continue the representation,
the court also held that the former AG himself was required to be
screened from participation:
Government attorneys, in whom the public reposes special confidence, are subject to even closer scrutiny than private attorneys.... Our duty to maintain that confidence is especially acute
when the government attorney has been the chief law enforcement officer in the State. Under some circumstances, former
government attorneys ought not to participate personally in lawsuits even if no independent grounds for disqualification exist.
Here, one relevant circumstance is that the private lawsuit relates,
albeit indirectly, to the regulation of casinos, an issue that has
stimulated heightened judicial sensitivity to maintaining public
confidence in government officials.1
2.

Consideration of Specific Harms Against Which the
Conflict-of-Interest Rules Do Not Protect.

In cases involving government lawyers, the appearance of impropriety test also enables authorities to consider whether the lawyer's representation threatens particular harms that the conflict-ofinterest rules do not otherwise take into account, including, most
significantly, the distortion of public decision making. This is most
evident in cases in which part-time government lawyers represent
private clients before courts or other public bodies. The principal
concern of Rule 1.7(b), namely, whether the lawyer will act disloyally
to a client or otherwise disadvantage a client in the matter in which
119, 122 (1986) ("When representation of public bodies is involved, this Court has
also recognized that 'the appearance of impropriety assumes an added dimension.'
Precisely because government attorneys are invested with the public trust and because they are more visible to the public, their conduct must be even more circum-

spect than the private attorney.") (citations omitted); Petition for Review of Opinion 552, 102 N.J. 194, 203, 507 A.2d 233, 238 (1986) ("Due to the sensitivity of their
roles, attorneys for governmental bodies are subject to closer scrutiny under the appearance-of-impropriety standard than non-governmental attorneys."); cf In re

Opinion No. 653, 132 N.J. 124, 130, 623 A.2d 241, 244 (1993) ("Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is especially important when the representation of governmental entities is involved.").
:09 93 N.J. 402, 409, 461 A.2d 585, 589 (1983).
10 Id. at 409-10, 461 A.2d at 589.
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the lawyer represents that client, is not what primarily is at stake in
this situation. As reflected in Opinion 4,1 the principal concern is
that the public decisionmaker will inappropriately favor the lawyer's
private client. This is as much a problem of government ethics as of
lawyer ethics.
The supreme court's discussion in In re Advisory Committee on ProfessionalEthics Opinion 621112 reflects this consideration. In the course
of determining whether a part-time legislative aid may represent private clients, the court adverted to prior opinions dealing with public
lawyers."' It observed that, where a part-time municipal attorney
represents a private party before an agency of the municipality, the
public may perceive that the decisionmaker will be unduly swayed
and the private client will obtain an unfair advantage. Similarly, a
part-time municipal attorney is forbidden from prosecuting disciplinary actions against police officers in the municipality to avoid chilling the municipal attorney's relationship with police officers with
whom he works in the investigation and enforcement of criminal
matters.
In some cases involving public lawyers, however, concerns about
the integrity of government or judicial decision making are not
raised. In such cases, the general conflict-of-interest rules provide a
more precise framework. Illustrative is the court's decision in Petition
for Review of Opinion 552,'4 where the question was whether a lawyer
could jointly represent a government entity and a government official in a civil rights action. Employing the framework of Rules 1.7(a)
and (b), the court focused on whether the respective clients' interests were likely to conflict. It concluded:
[W]e rule that in a [section] 1983 action, a government attorney
is precluded from representing co-defendant government officers
or employees only where the allegations or the facts present an
actual conflict of interests or the realistic possibility of such a conflict. If no such conflict is presented, then a government attorney
may simultaneously represent as co-defendants governmental officers or employees and the government entity."
The approach appeared to reflect the court's recognition that
the specific conflict rules provided the appropriate framework for
analysis and an appearance of impropriety standard would add little
:

See supra notes 28-80 and accompanying text.

112 128 N.J. 577, 608 A.2d 880 (1992).

See id. at 593-95, 608 A.2d at 888-89.
102 NJ. 194, 507 A.2d 238 (1986).

Id. at 208-09, 507 A.2d at 240-41.
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because the only threatened harms were those that Rules 1.7(a) and
(b) adequately took into account.
3.

Consideration of Prior Opinions

Additionally, the test obligates public lawyers to draw on both
the results and the reasoning of more than twenty years of decisions
pre-dating the adoption of the NewJersey Rules and authorizes decisionmakers to continue to develop law in a common-law fashion. In
re Advisory Committee on ProfessionalEthics Opinion 621116 provides one
example.' 7 Another is the court's opinion in Flamma v. Atlantic City
Fire Department,"s which held that counsel for the fire fighters' union
was not disqualified from representing a union member in a disciplinary proceeding in which another union member would testify.
The court distinguished an earlier decision, State v. Galati,"9 which
held that a lawyer who regularly represented the State Policemen's
Benevolent Association (PBA) could not represent a police officer in
a criminal proceeding at which another PBA member would testify,
because otherwise there would be suspicion that the witness's testimony was unduly influenced. The court emphasized that, unlike the
PBA, the fire fighters' union
is not an organization of law-enforcement officials, nor does it
have the "quasi-official status" and close relationship to the administration ofjustice that the PBA has. Although a union attorney may have a "bridge of confidentiality and trust" with local union members, absent a special relationship between the union
and the administration of justice, there is no significant risk of
detriment to public confidence in thejustice system requiring the
attorney's disqualification for an "appearance of impropriety."m
4.

Categorical Rule making

Finally, the appearance of impropriety test signifies that categorical prohibitions on dual representation are most likely to be appropriate in cases involving government lawyers. The purpose of
such per se rules is to protect against harms that generally inhere in
such categories of cases. As the supreme court has recognized:
Whether per se rules or standards to be applied on a case-by-case
basis are used in connection with the enforcement of the RPC's
16
117

:
19
20

128 NJ. 577, 608 A.2d 880 (1992).
See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
118 NJ. 583, 573 A.2d 158 (1990).
64 N.J. 572, 319 A.2d 220 (1974).
Flamma, 118 N.J. at 587-88, 573 A.2d at 160.
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and with the ethics principles and applications flowing from our
many cases, depends on the nature of the problem, the nature of
the rule, and our own good judgment. We assume that bright
line per se rules will be found more often in cases affecting public
employment and public employees than in those cases limited

strictly to private practices."'
All of this might seem to suggest that New Jersey should retain
its appearance of impropriety rule in contexts involving the public
interest. It seems clear that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its supervisory authority over the state bar, is generally satisfied with the
three decades of decisions that it and the Advisory Committee have
developed in these contexts. Essentially, the regulation of conflicts
of interest in contexts affecting the public interest has become the
work of the "common law." The courts and the Advisory Committee
use the appearance of impropriety rule as a basis for "making it up as
they go along," guided by considerations that apply uniquely where
the public has a stake in the quality of the representation. There is
justification for doing so, 1 as long as lawyers are not punished based
on rulings that they could not anticipate. And, for the most part, in
this context, they are not. Lawyers in public employ-those to whom
the appearance of impropriety rule chiefly applies-are rarely, if
ever, the subject of disciplinary proceedings or malpractice actions
brought by public agency clients based on conflicts of interest. At
the same time, to repeal the rule altogether, without substituting
rules codifying the prior decisions, might well be understood to
mean that the principles underlying the rule no longer hold sway.""
In re Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Opinion 621, 128 N.J. 577, 602, 608
A.2d 880, 892 (1992) (citations omitted).
12 See Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Federal Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation
of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 557-58 (1989) (arguing that interpreting
ethical rules in "common law" fashion is preferable to interpreting them-as if they
were statutes--in light of the drafters' intent).
123 In some states that shifted to the Model Rules, public confidence in the integrity of public decision making ceased to be weighed as heavily in assessing lawyers'
conduct, with the result that the conflict-of-interest rules came to apply essentially
the same way to lawyers in the public employ as to privately retained lawyers. For
example, a 1993 Arizona ethics opinion concluded, under Rule 1.7(b), that a state
legislator is not categorically barred from engaging in lobbying activities before the
legislature on behalf of private clients. See Ariz. Comm. on Ethics, Op. 93-09
(1993). Whether or not the lawyer-legislator may lobby on behalf of a particular
client depends on a case-by-case determination on whether the representation
would be affected by his or her responsibilities to the public or to his or her constituency. This was a situation in which, under the appearance of impropriety standard, the legislator might have been categorically forbidden from lobbying on behalf of private clients because of the need to protect public confidence in the
integrity of the legislature. But the Committee underscored that this consideration
121
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Why the Rule is UnnecessaryElsewhere

While New Jersey may be justified in retaining the appearance
of impropriety rule in contexts involving the public interest, this
does not mean that the ABA should revive the rule and urge it upon
the states that previously eliminated it pursuant to the example set
by the Model Rules. Outside New Jersey, even without the rule,
courts and ethics committees have remained free to interpret the
conflict-of-interest rules and other disciplinary provisions in light of
the principles that the appearance of impropriety standard embodies: that, in this category of cases, lawyers should be held to a particularly high standard, that the public's confidence in the integrity
of public decision making should be promoted, that earlier opinions
under the appearance of impropriety standard remain authoritative,
and that categorical rules may be appropriate. Departing from the
strict language of the disciplinary rules, courts and ethics committees
have shown that they can reach the same results as would have been
reached under the appearance of impropriety test."
For example, a 1993 Alabama ethics opinion, holding that a
lawyer who serves as a hearing officer for a state agency may not represent private clients before that same agency, relied on a rule forbidding a lawyer from "[s]tat[ing] or imply[ing] an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official." 2' The ethics
committee relied on an earlier opinion of a neighboring state's ethics committee applying the now-discarded appearance of impropriety
standard in a similar case, gave weight to the need to avoid "[t]he
would no longer be weighed. The committee explained:
Our analysis must be limited to the effect on the representation of the
client as regulated by the lawyer ethical rules, not by whether there is
an appearance of impropriety from the perspective of the public or
the legislator's constituency. That ethical tenet, like the provisions
imposing ethical restrictions on public officers and officials, is no
longer part of the ethical code governing the conduct of Arizona attorneys. Thus, under the existing ethical rules, it is for the legislature,
not the State Bar, to address any perceived appearance of impropriety
arising out of a lawyer-legislator lobbying situation.
Id. Other opinions of the same committee have indicated, however, that concern
about the appearance of impropriety retains some significance in evaluating the
conduct of lawyers in public employ, even if its significance has been reduced. See
Ariz. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 93-07 (1993); Ariz.
Comm. on Ethics, Op. 93-08 (1993).
124 See generally Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts
of Interest. A Survey and Some Proposals,81 Ky. L. REv. 1, 20 (1992-93) ("[M]ost of the case
law and opinions that seem to be propped up by the 'appearances" rationale are
still good law because they are, on closer examination, supported by more substan-

tial stuff.").
1

Ala. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 93-12 (1993).
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possible perception of favoritism or influence," and, in light of these
considerations, announced a categorical, broadly sweeping prohibition.' This approach was adopted notwithstanding the committee's
acknowledgment, in a different context involving the representation
of private clients, that the appearance of impropriety standard no
longer applies.'" Indeed, another state bar's ethics committee has
explicitly acknowledged that, notwithstanding the elimination of the
appearance of impropriety standard, the standard survives as an interpretive principle in cases involving the public interest.18
Thus, outside New Jersey, an appearance of impropriety rule
would mark a break from precedent that is unnecessary, because, in
cases where the public has a stake, the interpretive principles embodied by the rule can be employed even in the rule's absence. This is
not to say, however, that the Model Rules should not give greater
recognition to the particular need for probity on the part of lawyers
in public employ (with the possible exception of prosecutors, who
are already subject to a distinct rule). But given its checkered past,
reintroducing the appearance of impropriety rule is not the optimal
way to do so. Rather, as Charles Wolfram has suggested, the principles previously developed under the appearance of impropriety
standard should be employed in standards and rules "that are focused, relatively precise, and much less likely to lead to ad hoc results
than would a general-appearances test." ' 2
III. THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD IN CASES INVOLVING
THE INTERESTS OF PRIVATE CLIENTS

A.

The Expansion of the Rule in New Jersey

The Debevoise Committee addressed the appearance of impropriety test exclusively as it had been applied to government lawyers
and did not acknowledge the comparatively few cases in which the
test was applied to lawyers representing private clients in matters of
private concern. This may have been because, prior to the adoption
Seid.
Ala. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 94-13 (1994).
1
See Conn. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 9510 (1995); see also Conn. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 96-17 (1996).
12 WoLFRAM, supra note 12, at 322; Nolan, supra note 87, at 77-78. For
an argument that specific, contextual rules of ethics should be favored over general, universal ones, see Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules ofProfesionalConduct Should Govern Lawyers
in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created, 64 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 460
(1996).
126
1
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of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the appearance of impropriety
test was generally perceived as a test to be used in cases involving
government lawyers, although, as noted above, it had been employed
in some cases involving the representation of private clients as well.""
This may also have been because, if the Model Rules were adopted as
proposed, there would be no need to use the test to compensate for
the two obvious deficiencies in the Code as it applied to conflicts of
interest in private representation.'
In rejecting the Debevoise Committee's recommendation, however, the NewJersey Supreme Court adopted a provision that was not
limited to cases involving the public interest. On the contrary, Rule
1.7(c) (2) preserved "the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the
effect that.., multiple representation is not permissible ... in those
situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted
with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses
substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest
of one of the clients.""3
On its face, the rule placed two significant limits on the use of
the appearance of impropriety test, but both came to be ignored.
Although by its plain terms Rule 1.7(c) (2) applied only in cases involving "multiple representation," the rule has been invoked to address other conflicts of interest.'
Furthermore, although the rule
did no more than preserve "the effect of case law and ethics opinions" applying the appearance of impropriety test to "certain cases or
situations," the rule has been thought to preserve not only the holdings of prior case law, but the appearance of impropriety test itself.
As presently conceived, the overriding concern of the appearance of
impropriety test has evolved from its original focus on confidence in
government to the more nebulous concept of confidence in the
bar.M This has led to the unnecessary reliance upon an ad hoc apISOSee, e.g., Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 374 n.1,
416
A.2d 801, 805 n.1 (1980) (quoting NEw JERsEy STATE BAR AssOCIATiON, SPECIAL
COMMITEE'S REPORT that "recommended further explication 'with respect to conflicts of interest on the part of lawyers representing governmental agencies[,]' noting that '[i]n such situations, the term appearance of impropriety might be more
appropriately considered an ethical consideration than a "rubric"'").
1
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
N.J. RuLs OF PROFFssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (1995) (emphasis
added).
: See, e.g., InreTenure Hearing, 103 N.J. 548, 511 A.2d 1171 (1986).
See, e.g., In re Inquiry to the Advisory Comm., No. 58-91(B), 130 N.J. 431, 434,
616 A.2d 1290, 1291 (1992) ("Our overriding concern is for maintaining public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession."); In re Petition for Review of
Opinion No. 569, 103 N.J. 325, 330, 511 A.2d 119, 121 (1986) ("The 'appearance'
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pearance of impropriety analysis, even in those cases that might be
decided by other, more precise, and less restrictive rules.
Two successive opinions dealing with a lawyer's representation
of opposing counsel are illustrative. The question before the Advisory Committee was whether Lawyer A may represent Lawyer B in a
personal injury matter while, with the consent of the respective clients, the two lawyers, or their law firms, represent opposing sides in
an unrelated contract matter. In Opinion 678,'-" the Committee acknowledged that the representation would be permissible under
Rule 1.7(b), as other ethics tribunals had previously found. The
Committee concluded, however, that the inquiry "should be analyzed under RPC 1.7(c)(2), which pertains to situations creating 'an
appearance of impropriety.'""6 Under this standard, it found that
the representation was categorically forbidden.
In reaching this conclusion, Opinion 678 first strung together
quotations from prior advisory opinions and judicial decisions applying the appearance of impropriety standard to lawyers for public entities and in other cases involving the public interest. The principal
import of these quotations was that (a) the doctrine applies even in
some cases where no actual harm would occur, (b) the doctrine
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,
and (c) the doctrine calls for viewing the proposed representation
from the perspective of the public, not the client.
The Committee next identified possible harms that might appear to occur as a result of the representation. On one hand, the
lawyer representing opposing counsel might litigate less zealously in
the contract action out of sympathy for the other lawyer, who is a client in the personal injury action. On the other hand, the lawyerclient might litigate less zealously in the contract action out of similar regard for his counterpart.
Finally, the Committee noted that it had dealt with a similar
question in an earlier opinion dealing with a lawyer's representation
of a prosecutor. The Committee held that the earlier opinion was
doctrine is intended not to prevent any actual conflicts of interest but to bolster the
public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession."); In re Weinroth, 100
N.J. 343, 349, 495 A.2d 417, 421 (1985) (stating:
Our precedent has always emphasized that not only impropriety but
'even the appearance of impropriety' that casts doubt upon the integrity of the legal process must be avoided .... Thus, when it is evident
that an informed and concerned person would find the attorney's relationship improper, an attorney must avoid the conduct that creates
such an impression.).
6 N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 678 (1994).
"$

Id.
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indistinguishable, even though the assistant prosecutor was a public
employee and his employer was a public entity that, under conflictof-interest doctrine, could not consent to the proposed representation.
Thereafter, in Opinion 679,'3' the Advisory Committee issued a
new opinion that superseded Opinion 678. Again, the Committee
began by acknowledging that the representation was permissible under Rule 1.7(b). The Committee found that, even though the inquiring lawyer's representation of a party to the contract action
could be "materially limited" by his representation of the opposing
lawyer in an unrelated personal injury action, the lawyer "reasonably
believe [d] that representation will not be adversely affected."'" Further, both clients were said to have consented after full disclosure
and consultation-the requirements of which were elaborated in the
opinion. Again, however, the Committee found that this "does not
end the inquiry," because "[u]nder RPC 1.7(c), it is necessary to
weigh the perceptions of 'ordinary knowledgeable citizens' as to
whether there is an 'appearance of impropriety.'" 1'9 The opinion
supported this proposition with a string of citations to seven prior
supreme court decisions, some calling for "a case-by-case, factsensitive analysis," and some upholding per se rules-but all dealing
with lawyers for public agencies."'
The Committee concluded-without explanation and contrary
to its previous opinion-that the circumstances called for a case-bycase, rather than per se, approach. This said, the Committee identified what it believed to be "the key factors which an attorney must
weigh in light of the particular facts, in determining what an ordi4 ' These seven factors
nary knowledgeable citizen would conclude."M
were (1) the non-lawyer client's level of sophistication, (2) whether
the non-lawyer client received independent legal advice in determining whether to consent, (3) whether the lawyer-client was represented first or had a prior relationship with the lawyer representing
him, (4) whether the lawyer-client was represented in a highly specialized matter, (5) whether the representation of the non-lawyer client had just begun or was near conclusion, (6) whether the two representations were by the same lawyer or by different lawyers in the

7

N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 679 (1995).

1s8 Id.
139

Id.

140 Id. (citations omitted).
141

Id.
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same firm, and (7) whether one of the parties is a public entity."
The opinion provided no guidance as to the relative weight or significance of these factors, but simply concluded that "if evaluation of
the various applicable factors leave counsel with doubt as to proceeding with the new representation
of adversary counsel, such represen45
tation must be declined."
B.

The Superiority of Less Vague Rules

The specific conflict-of-interest rules provide significantly more
guidance, and more appropriate guidance, than the appearance of
impropriety test. A comparison of how these rules would apply to
the situation in Opinions 678 and 679 serves as an illustration. As discussed above, the question before the Advisory Committee was essentially the following: If Lawyer A represents Lawyer B in a matter, may
these lawyers or their firms represent opposing parties in unrelated
litigation? The Committee's response to this question in Opinion 678
represented a false start. Its response in Opinion 679 was more extensive than most of its opinions dealing with conflicts of interest, as
well as, evidently, the product of considered reflection. Thus, Opinion 679 might fairly be viewed as an exemplar of the use of the appearance of impropriety standard.
As the Advisory Committee recognized, the specifically applicable conflict rule was Rule 1.7(b). Its framework is consistent with the
counterpart provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility as
well as with contemporary understandings within the legal profession
nationally.'" Rule 1.7(b) identifies three categories of cases. In the
first, there are no restrictions because, objectively, it is not a situation
in which "the representation of the client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests." 45 In the second category of cases,
where in theory there is a risk that the representation will be affected, but as a practical matter "the lawyer reasonably believes that
the representation will not be adversely affected," the lawyer may
undertake the representation as long as "the client consents after a
full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation."". Finally, in
the most serious cases, where, as an objective matter, it would not be
2
:

See id.

NJ.Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 679 (1995).

" See, e.g., REsTATEMErT OF THE LAw, THE LAW GOVERNG LAWYERs
§

(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter RESrATEMENT].
4
NJ.Ruus OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr RuLE,1.7(b) (1995).
46 Id.

201
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reasonable for the lawyer to believe that the representation will not
be adversely affected or where the lawyer does not personally hold
this belief, the lawyer may not undertake the representation even
with client consent.
The framework of Rule 1.7(b), although general, provides a reasonable amount of guidance by requiring a lawyer objectively to
identify precisely how the lawyer's responsibilities to one client or
the lawyer's own interests would tend to harm the representation of
another client, how significant the harm would be, and how probable it is that the harm will occur. Further, the framework is analytically sound. It draws appropriate distinctions in light of competing
considerations. While the interest in protecting clients and ensuring
that they are served with undivided loyalty might favor the most restrictive approach, other considerations argue against restrictions in
cases where, despite a theoretical problem, one can say with a reasonable degree of confidence that the client will be properly
served. 47

147

See REsTATEmENT, supra note 144, § 201 cmt., stating that
avoiding conflicts of interest can impose significant costs on lawyers
and clients. Prohibition of conflicts of interest should therefore be no
broader than necessary. First, conflict avoidance can make representation more expensive. To the extent that conflict of interest rules
prevent multiple clients from being represented by a single lawyer,
one or both clients will be required to find other lawyers. That might
entail uncertainty concerning the successor lawyers' qualifications,
usually additional cost, and the inconvenience of separate representation. In matters in which individual claims are small, representation
of multiple claimants might be required if the claims are to be considered at all. Second, limitations imposed by conflict rules can interfere
with client expectations. At the very least, one of the clients might be
deprived of the services of a lawyer whom the client had a particular
reason to retain, perhaps on the basis of a long-time association with
the lawyer. In some communities or fields of practice there might be
no lawyer who is perfectly conflict-free. Third, obtaining informed
consent to conflicted representation might compromise important interests ....
[Clonsent to a conflict of interest requires that each affected client give consent based on adequate information. The process of obtaining informed consent is not only potentially timeconsuming; it might also be impractical because it would require the
disclosure of information that the clients would prefer not to have disclosed, for example, the subject matter about which they have consulted the lawyer. Fourth, conflicts prohibitions interfere with lawyers'
own freedom to practice according to their own best judgment of appropriate professional behavior. It is appropriate to give significant
weight to the freedom and professionalism of lawyers in the formulation of legal rules governing conflicts.
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Finally, Rule 1.7(b) fully takes account of those aspects of the
appearance of impropriety standard that would be relevant in cases
involving private matters. The first is the distinction between socalled actual and potential conflicts."
Rule 1.7(b) in effect proscribes potential as well as actual conflicts-its reach is not limited to
cases in which a lawyer necessarily will serve the client disloyally. Second, the rule recognizes that lawyers may not assess the propriety of
the representation based exclusively on their subjective judgment
about whether they will be able to render adequate representation.
It requires that the lawyer's assessment be objectively reasonable.
Thus, the rule in effect employs the perspective of an objective and
knowledgeable onlooker. Third, Rule 1.7(b) makes distinctions that
take account of the interest in preserving public confidence in the
legal profession, while also giving weight to competing interests. Finally, the rule allows for categorical prohibitions in situations in
which there is an unacceptable risk that the lawyer will serve with divided loyalty or otherwise render inadequate representation. Outside New Jersey, authorities have imposed such restrictions under
Rule 1.7 or its predecessor, Rule 5-105, in many situations where it
would be unreasonable to conclude that the representation will be
unimpaired. 1 49
Under Rule 1.7(b) (or its predecessor, DR 5-105 of the Model
Code), one would begin by assessing the likelihood that, when opposing lawyers (or other members of their firms) are in a lawyerclient relationship, one of the opposing lawyers will "pull his
punches" in the litigation in order to avoid offending the other lawyer. Because the likelihood this impropriety will occur depends on
the circumstances, one would attempt to identify factors that would
make this occurrence more or less likely. Depending on the likelihood, a lawyer either may undertake the representation without dis-

148 As

Monroe Freedman has noted:

[It is a mistake to talk about conflicts of interest as "actual" and
.potential." Properly understood, conflicts of interest are always potential. The purposes of rules against them is preventive-to forestall
the occurrence of substantive improprieties, such as a breach of confidentiality or some other act of disloyalty to a client. Thus, a lawyer has
a conflict whenever there is a reasonable possibility that the lawyer's
loyalty to one client might be impaired sometime down the line by the

lawyer's obligations to another client or by the lawyer's personal interests.
Monroe Freedman, You CAN Do It, But You Shouldn't, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1992, at 43.
149 See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Op. 619 (1991);
N.Y. State
Comm. on Ethics, Op. 595 (1988).
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closure, may do so with consent after consultation, or may not do so
at all.
An illustration of this approach is Opinion 1996-3 of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York'" This opinion recognizes
that the critical question is whether one of the lawyers will serve less
zealously to avoid offending the opposing counsel and that the answer depends on the facts. Among other things, it provides both an
example of where consent should not be required, because "it is inconceivable that the independent professional judgment" of the lawyer will be diminished, and an example of where the representation
should be improper even with consent because it is difficult to see
how the lawyer's independent judgment would not be affected.'
The opinion also provides factors to assist the lawyer in determining
where in the spectrum a particular case falls. More recently, the
ABA's ethics committee adopted a similar analysis." 2
In contrast, Opinion 679 lists various factors of doubtful relevance to the question of whether one of the lawyers is likely to disserve his client.'53 For example, the first two factors are "the level of
sophistication of the non-lawyer client who gave consent to the dual
representation" and "whether the non-lawyer client received independent legal advice in determining whether to consent."'" While
these considerations are relevant to whether the client's consent is
voluntary and adequately informed, they have little, if any, bearing
on whether the lawyer will serve less zealously out of regard for opposing counsel.
The fourth factor-"whether the attorney client is seeking representation in a highly specialized matter, for which the pool of experienced New Jersey attorneys is quite small"' 5 -- seems equally irrelevant. The Committee's apparent premise is that, as a matter of
policy, the rule ought to be applied less restrictively in this situation,
because otherwise lawyers who need legal assistance will have diffi150 Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Op. 1996-3 (1996).
151See id.
152 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-406

(1997).
153 A different set of criticisms of this opinion is contained in Elisabeth
E. Boyan,
Reconsidering (Again) Conflict of Interest Arising From Lauyers Representing Lauyers in
NewJersey, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1377 (1996). The author contends that most of
the seven factors identified in Opinion 679 are flawed, the opinion provides no
guidance as to the relevant weight of the factors, and the opinion is unduly restrictive in requiring a lawyer to refuse the representation if there is any doubt whether
an appearance of impropriety exists.
55
N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 679 (1995).
1I5Id.
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culty obtaining it. Yet, if one focuses on the risk to Lawyer B's client,
this factor cuts the other way. If it would be especially difficult for
Lawyer B to find other counsel, he will be especially careful to avoid
offending Lawyer A.
On the other hand, if the question is one of policy, this factor
fails to take account of the broader interests in encouraging lawyers
to seek counsel outside their own law firms and in enabling lawyers
to retain counsel of choice. To give just one example: a lawyer who
serves in a fiduciary capacity-e.g., as the administrator of an estate-must often retain a lawyer to represent him in that capacity.
The contemporary literature recognizes that conflicts of interest are
more likely to arise when the lawyer-fiduciary (e.g., the administrator
of an estate) retains a lawyer within his own law firm to represent
him or represents himself.'56 Opinion 679, however, encourages the
lawyer to do precisely that.
At the same time, because it focused on the appearance, rather
than the likelihood, of impropriety, Opinion 679 failed to identify factors that are important. The New York City opinion gives several obvious examples, including the nature of the work being performed
by the lawyers for their respective clients and the relative importance
of the representations to the respective lawyers or firms. The opinion gives an extreme example illustrating the importance of these
factors: Lawyer P represents Lawyer Q and receives approximately
ten percent of his income from that representation; Lawyer P is then
retained by a litigant who has discharged prior counsel for refusing
to seek personal sanctions against the opposing lawyer, Lawyer Q.
Here, the Committee concluded, Lawyer P's representation is so
likely to be influenced by concerns for Lawyer Q that the new client
should not be represented even with client consent.
C. Deficiencies of the Appearance of Impropriety Test
As discussed below, Opinion 679 illustrates two additional problems with the appearance of impropriety test when it is applied outside the traditional contexts implicating the public interest. First,
the rule is unduly vague and therefore provides insufficient guidance. Second, the rule is both incoherent standing alone and, when
See Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary
Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations,62 Fo~RimAm L. REv. 1357, 1386-98 (1994); see
156

also Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62

FoRDHAM L. REv. 989, 999 (1994) (noting that conflicts may arise when the lawyerfiduciary hires his or her firm or serves in the additional role as his or her own lawyer).
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included with conflict rules taking a different approach, makes New
Jersey's conflict-of-interest law as a whole incoherent.
1. The Appearance of Impropriety Test is Unduly Vague
Rules of professional conduct are meant to provide guidance to
lawyers about the propriety of their proposed conduct in the countless situations in which no advisory opinion or judicial decision addresses the precise situation. Thus, it is important for the rules to
provide clear guidance-not leave lawyers confused. The appearance of impropriety standard, however, provides inadequate guidance in contexts involving the representation of private parties because it is so vague.
In cases in which other rules, such as Rules 1.7(b) or 1.9(a)(1),
are applicable, the appearance of impropriety test simply substitutes
an unfocused approach for a focused analytic framework that is already available. The impressionistic nature of the standard is captured in the following characterization:
Whether a conflict creates an appearance of impropriety depends
on the facts of each case .... An appearance of impropriety
'must be something more than a fanciful possibility. It must have
some reasonable basis.' ...

Sometimes the line between conduct

that appears to be proper or improper is hazy. Where there is no
conflict in fact, an appearance can sometimes shade into the illusion of a conflict. 15 7
Under this test, as thus characterized, lawyers and decisionmakers
are called on to draw a line, on a case-by-case basis, between cases involving an appearance of impropriety and those involving a mere illusion of a conflict.
The test embodies no limiting principles. Nothing in the test
suggests where to draw the line, for example, between representations that are permissible with client consent and those that are forbidden even with client consent. Likewise, nothing in the test indicates when a per se rule should be employed and when an ad hoc
test is preferable. Opinions 678 and 679 reflected both infirmities. In
the first opinion, the Committee held that even if all clients consented after disclosure and consultation, a lawyer could never represent opposing counsel. In the second opinion, the Committee held
that sometimes consent would suffice and sometimes it would not,
but the opinion could do little more than list factors of questionable
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significance to guide the lawyer in deciding where to draw the line in
a given case.
Further, the notion of adopting the perspective of "an ordinary
knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts" adds nothing of
substance to the analysis, other than serving as a metaphor for the
requirement that the situation be viewed objectively. The hypothetical ordinary knowledgeable citizen is a fiction. As the court recognized in In re Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 621,'"
there is no empirical basis for imputing any particular perception to
the public.'59 One applying the appearance of impropriety standard
must, therefore, draw on his or her own imagination to determine
whether the knowledgeable citizen would perceive an "appearance of
impropriety," on one hand, or a mere "illusion of a conflict," on the
other.
Even in cases in which specific rules, such as Rules 1.7(b) and
1.9(a)(1), may seem inadequate to address the situation, invoking
the appearance of impropriety test is less desirable than either
adopting a restrictive interpretation of the existing conflict-ofinterest rules or developing a more precise alternative approach. For
example, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds," the court invoked the appearance of impropriety test to address whether a lawyer who had moved
from the defendant's law firm to the plaintiffs law firm had formerly
represented the defendant. That the lawyer had done so would have
been a foregone conclusion under any test, since he had billed time
to the client, performed legal research, and discussed the case with
others. 6' The appearance of impropriety test added nothing. It had
128 N.J. 577, 608 A.2d 880 (1992).
In In re Opinion 621, the question was whether a part-time legislative aid may
represent private clients before government agencies other than those connected
with the legislative branch. The Advisory Committee's reasoning, as described by
the court, was that "whether the State is in fact the legislative aid's client, a knowledgeable member of the public might reasonably think it is, simply because the legislative aide is a lawyer working for the State." Id. at 597, 608 A.2d at 890. The
court rejected this reasoning, finding that
[i]t depends completely on the assertion of a factual proposition not
evident: that the public would view a part-time legislative aide as a
lawyer hired by the State to provide legal representation for the State,
its client; and further, that the public would perceive this part-time
legislative aide as having not just the agency or board or bureau with
which he or she is connected, but the entire State government, as his
or her client.
Id. at 597-98, 608 A.2d at 890. But, of course, this lack of evidence exists in every
case.
:60 109 NJ. 201, 536 A.2d 243 (1988).
6
See id. at 216, 536 A.2d at 250.
'5
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the effect, however, of discouraging the court from offering an explanation providing more substantial guidance to the decision of future cases.
By using this vague test, rather than a more precise one, several
unfortunate consequences result. As noted, New Jersey lawyers receive less guidance from the Rules of Professional Conduct and
authorities interpreting them. Additionally, in situations in which
New Jersey opinions do not completely resolve the question, New
Jersey lawyers cannot, with sufficient confidence, turn for guidance
to authorities outside the state. This is a problem, in part, because
lawyers in private practice have traditionally been more likely targets
of disciplinary proceedings than lawyers in public employ. Even if
disciplinary authorities could be counted on to exercise discretion in
contexts where the appropriate standard of conduct is unclear, adversaries and disgruntled former clients cannot be expected to do
the same. In litigation, the vagueness of the standard invites parties
to file disqualification motions for tactical reasons. The burden on
the lawyer who allegedly failed to "avoid an appearance of impropriety" will, in part, be shared by the court, which will have to inquire
into the lawyer's conduct. Even in cases where there is clearly no
reason to believe that a lawyer will act disloyally or breach client confidences, the court will have to ascertain whether there would be an
appearance of impropriety or whether a possible concern is merely
illusory.'62 Even more ominously, conduct that is improper under
the appearance of impropriety standard might be advanced by a dissatisfied litigant as the basis of a malpractice action. Even though
the underlying harm is that the conduct "looked bad" from the perspective of a hypothetical observer, a former client who was dissatisfied with the result of the representation may argue that the lawyer's
apparently improper conduct was to blame.
2.

The Incoherence of the Rules and Opinions

Employing the appearance of impropriety standard in contexts
involving the representation of private parties makes the New Jersey
opinions, as well as the rules themselves, appear to be incoherent in
three respects.
First, the applicable doctrine appears to be incoherent insofar
as it is to be applied to cases involving exclusively private interests in
In a prior article, I argued that disqualification orders should be issued only
to remedy concrete harms, and that otherwise, personal sanctions are the appropriate response to violations of the applicable conflict rules. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The JudicialRole, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 71 (1996).
1
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the same manner as it is applied to cases involving public interests.
As discussed above, the appearance of impropriety test calls for scrutinizing representation by government lawyers especially closely and
under a more restrictive standard than the one applied to other lawyers. It makes no sense to say that government lawyers will be subject
to greater restrictions under an appearance of impropriety test, but
then to judge lawyers for private clients under the same test. This is
precisely what the Advisory Committee seemed to do, however, in
Opinion 678, first in reciting general pronouncements from opinions
dealing with government lawyers and then in holding that the situation in a prior opinion dealing with government lawyers was indistinguishable from the situation before it. The Committee seemed to
do the same in Opinion 679, which cited four prior opinions dealing
with lawyers for public entities to illustrate the "case-by-case, factsensitive analysis" that it elected to undertake instead of a per se approach (which it illustrated with three prior opinions, also dealing
with lawyers for private entities).
Second, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves appear to
be internally inconsistent insofar as both Rule 1.7(b) and the more
restrictive appearance of impropriety test simultaneously apply in the
same class of cases. As noted, Rule 1.7(b) explicitly provides that
representation may be undertaken with client consent in cases in
which, at least as understood by the Advisory Committee, the representation would nevertheless involve an "appearance of impropriety."
Advisory Opinions 678 and 679 illustrate the point. In these opinions,
the Committee acknowledged that, under Rule 1.7(b), a lawyer may
represent opposing counsel with client consent. Nonetheless, the
Committee held that a lawyer was forbidden from undertaking the
representation-categorically in the first opinion, potentially in the
second opinion-under Rule 1.7(c). In future cases, not addressed
by the Advisory Committee, a lawyer seeking guidance about the
propriety of a professional representation will encounter inconsistent rules.
Finally, the appearance of impropriety doctrine, insofar as it is
read (as the Advisory Committee reads it) to be more restrictive than
Rule 1.7(b), is internally incoherent. The premise is that, in some
situations where the representation is proper under Rule 1.7(b), a
reasonably informed member of the public would nevertheless perceive an impropriety. Further, the impropriety in cases involving private matters would be that the lawyer would fail adequately to fulfill
his responsibilities to his client. It is hard to see how an informed
member of the public might perceive this impropriety at the same
time that the lawyer complies with Rule 1.7(b). Suppose that, fully in
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accordance with the applicable rules of professional conduct, a lawyer undertakes to represent a client after concluding objectively that
this is not a situation in which "the representation of the client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests." 63 Or, suppose
that, fully in accordance with the applicable rules of professional
conduct, a lawyer undertakes to represent a client after concluding
objectively that "the representation will not be adversely affected"
and obtaining the consent of the client after full disclosure and consultation. 1" In these situations, it would be unreasonable for an informed member of the public to perceive any impropriety in allowing a competent client to select counsel with full awareness of the
theoretical, objectively minimal risk that the lawyer's representation
will be compromised. Further, the rules should not be structured to
satisfy unreasonable hypothetical observers.
As long as the lawyer complies with the conflict-of-interest rules
and these rules are reasonable-as Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a)(1) happen to be-the ordinary informed member of the public should be
satisfied with the integrity of the profession. There is certainly nothing to suggest otherwise in the experience of the jurisdictions that
employ Rules 1.7 and 1.9 without the appearance of impropriety test.
Indeed, it might be argued that New Jersey's more restrictive approach simply encourages the public to lack confidence in the integrity of the bar. The premise of this test is, after all, that the public is
entitled to mistrust lawyers who act in conformity with the conflict-ofinterest rules applicable in every other state, and that a more restrictive approach is therefore necessary. Yet, essential to the very concept of law as a profession rather than a business is that lawyers, as
professionals, can be trusted to serve their clients loyally and zealously and to turn down clients where they are unable to meet these
obligations. Thus, as noted in the draft Restatement, "[i]t is appropriate to give significant weight to the... professionalism
of lawyers in
"
the formulation of legal rules governing conflicts. 16IV. CONCLUSION
Early in its life in the law, the principle that lawyers should avoid
the appearance of impropriety was simply an exhortation in an otherwise undistinguished bar association ethics opinion directed spe-

16-

NEwJERsEY RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1984).
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cifically at lawyers in public employ. It was intended as a moral or
prudential principle, not a legally enforceable norm. Indeed, the
opinion containing this exhortation interpreted provisions of the
ABA Canons that were themselves intended to serve, not as enforceable law, but as general guides to lawyers in the exercise of their individual discretion. From this humble beginning developed a rule
applicable in New Jersey to all lawyers in all aspects of professional
representation that may be enforced by disciplinary bodies and
courts.
There is nothing to justify preserving the appearance of impropriety test in NewJersey (or reviving it elsewhere) insofar as it applies
to lawyers representing private clients with respect to civil matters.
Specific conflict-of-interest rules such as Rule 1.7(b), standing alone,
appropriately address conflicts of interest in this context. To the extent that new problems are identified that are not adequately addressed by this and the other rules, new rules may be added to fill
the gap or courts may issue ad hoc pronouncements toward this end.
An appearance of impropriety test is a poor alternative. Standing
alone, it provides little direction. Together with other, more specific
rules, it makes ethics law incoherent.
It is tempting to attack the appearance of impropriety test
wholesale, as critics did before the Model Rules eliminated it. But it
is important to recognize, as some have,' the virtues of the rule in
166

Set, e.g., Conn. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.

37 (1995):
In emphasizing, to the extent we do, the appearance of conflicting in-

terests as an important consideration, we are not unmindful of the
subjectivity of-and frequent unfairness resulting from application
of-a standard that ignores intent and purity of motives in favor of

perceptions often born of misinformation or insufficient information.
In private law situations, we would be reluctant to find conflict, if the
only reason for doing so were the appearance of a conflict.
We deal here, however, with that aspect of a lawyer's life most
open to the public and therefore most susceptible to popular judgment the lawyer as public official. In that context, we do not write
on a clean slate. Connecticut case law, at least since [1948], has been
unequivocal in its insistence that public officials must not only be free
of impropriety, but of the appearance of impropriety as well. This insistence upon satisfying public perceptions is based upon the premise
that public confidence in the integrity and disinterestedness of public
officials upon which all democratic governments must ultimately depend. Thus, in the area of the lawyer as public official, the dictates
and counsel of the Code of Professional Responsibility are reinforced
by the significant body of common law applying to public officials
generally.
Id.; see also Conn. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
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contexts especially implicating the public interest-that is, cases involving public employment, public employees, or criminal proceedings. In this context, where the appearance of impropriety test
originated and has most fully been elaborated, the test stands for the
propositions that lawyers for public agencies should be regulated
more strictly than others, that categorical rules are more likely to be
warranted in cases involving public lawyers, and that the integrity of
government operations and of the criminal process should be considered in applying conflict-of-interest rules in this context. These
propositions are appropriate ones, and the ABA ought to draft
model provisions giving them effect. At least until it does so, New
Jersey might plausibly retain the appearance of impropriety test in
this limited context, rather than eliminate it altogether, in order to
preserve as "common law" more than 200 published opinions to date
that have applied the test to lawyers in public employ and in other
contexts where the public has a direct stake.

96-17 (1996) ("The appearance of impropriety standard had little useful application
to lawyers engaged in the private sector."); Conn. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 95-10 (1995) (quoting Conn. Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 37).

